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DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY-FOREIGN NATIONALS EMPLOYED BY THE
UNITED NATIONS ARE NOT AFFORDED THE SAME DEGREE OF IMMUNITY AS
FOREIGN DIPLOMATS; SEIZURE OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION FROM A FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT VIOLATE HIS RIGHT TO
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490 (D.
N.J. 1978).
Defendants Valdik Aleksandrovich Enger and Rudolf Petrovich
Chemyayev, citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were
both employees of the United Nations working in New York City.
Chernyayev served as an Administrative Officer in the Office of Per-
sonnel Services, Enger as a Political Affairs Officer attached to the
Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security
Council Affairs. They had been under FBI surveillance for espionage
activities from August 1977 to May 1978. On numerous occasions,
they had allegedly obtained from an American naval officer secret
information relating to the national defense of the United States.
Evidence indicated that the defendants had paid the officer, who ac-
ted as a "confidential government source" in the subsequent prose-
cution, several thousand dollars to deliver information regarding
anti-submarine warfare, including materials involving underwater
acoustics, submarine detection systems, and other classified U.S.
Navy programs. Repeatedly, the FBI had observed the defendants
making contact with the American naval officer. At some of these
meetings, the defendants were accompanied by the Third Secretary
of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, only identified as
Zinyakin.
On May 20, 1978, the confidential source took films provided by
the FBI of the U.S. Navy Light Airborne Multipurpose System for
submarine detection. Following instructions given by Enger during a
previous operation, the source placed the film in a Tropicana orange
juice carton and left it at a dropsite in New Jersey. There he picked
up a bartlett pears can that contained four thousand dollars in
twenty-dollar bills and a schedule for future operations.
Shortly after the naval officer left the area, defendant Enger,
accompanied by Secretary Zinyakin, drove to the dropsite. Zinyakin
got out of the car, picked up the Tropicana carton and placed it in a
brown paper bag. Before he could return to the car, however, Ziny-
akin was apprehended by two FBI agents. The agents took the bag,
opened the carton, and found the films that they had given to the
naval officer earlier that day. According to one agent's affidavit, sub-
mitted by the Government in the subsequent litigation, the Tropi-
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cana carton was sticking out from the top of the bag, and thus the
container that he knew carried national defense secrets was in plain
view. The agents then placed Enger and Chernyayev under arrest.
Zinyakin was not arrested because of his entitlement to immunity as
a foreign diplomat.
The defendants were charged in a three-count indictment alleg-
ing espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage in violation of 18
U.S.C. section 793.' The present action came before Judge Lacey of
the Federal District Court in New Jersey on a variety of defense
motions.
The defendants sought, inter alia, to dismiss the indictment on a
claim of diplomatic immunity. They relied on letters submitted by
the Honorable Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the
United States, and by the Honorable Erik Suy, Legal Counsel to the
United Nations, to support their claim that they held diplomatic
rank. Ambassador Dobrynin's letters claimed that the defendants
each held the diplomatic rank of Second Secretary, and that this
status was conferred by decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Su-
preme Soviet. Mr. Suy's letter indicated that Chernyayev was em-
ployed by the United Nations as a Personnel Officer and that Enger
held the rank of Political Officer. The court noted that the letters
contained no claim that the defendants were designated Soviet rep-
resentatives or that they had ever been assigned to perform any dip-
lomatic duties on behalf of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the defense
could not claim immunity based upon official diplomatic accredita-
tion, but rather, they could only argue that they merited de facto
diplomatic status.
The court decided that the lack of official accreditation prohib-
ited the defendants from claiming diplomatic protection. First, the
court concluded that the general diplomatic immunity statute, 22
U.S.C. section 252,1 was inapplicable because the defendants were
not members of the protected class, i.e. ambassadors and public
ministers of a foreign state.3 For the same reason, the defendants
could not invoke the immunity provision of the Vienna Convention
1. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1976) makes it unlawful to obtain or transmit information
respecting the national defense with the intent to use the information either to cause
injury to the United States or to use for the benefit of a foreign country.
2. 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1976) grants to any ambassador or public minister of any
foreign country immunity from arrest, imprisonment, or attachment of his goods or
chattels.
3. Although the court analyzed this case in light of the existing statutory law,
sections 252-254 of 22 U.S.C. were repealed one month subsequent to this decision.
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on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes.' Article
29 of this convention provides that the person of a diplomatic agent
is inviolable and shall not be subject to any form of arrest or deten-
tion. Further, article 1 defines "diplomatic agent" as the head of the
mission or a member of the mission staff having diplomatic rank.
Enger and Chernyayev were thus not afforded immunity under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Furthermore, the defendants' alleged espionage activities were
not protected under the International Organization Immunities Act
(IOIA).5 The court read this act as granting employees of appropriate
organizations immunity from laws regulating entry into and depar-
ture from the United States as well as immunity from liability ac-
cruing from acts done within the scope of employment. Thus, the
IOIA only provides the basis for a limited grant of immunity. This
interpretation is supported by the policy underlying the IOIA. Since
the United Nations maintains its headquarters in New York, a large
number of foreign government employees reside in the United States.
Since it is impracticable to evaluate the activities of each employee
prospectively, such employees can only be granted immunity based
on a narrow interpretation of the scope of their employment. To hold
otherwise would open the floodgates to allow foreign agents to engage
in espionage activities under the broad umbrella of diplomatic im-
munity.' Thus, for all of the above reasons, the court denied the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of diplomatic immunity.
The defendants also moved to suppress the evidence of the films
seized from Secretary Zinyakin on the basis that they were illegally
seized without a warrant and in violation of his diplomatic status.
The court first determined that the defendants had standing to as-
sert this defense, because the second count of the indictment was
based on the possession of illegal material,' and because the search
was conducted in their immediate presence.' On the merits, the
court held that the immunity from seizure afforded a diplomat's
4. Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, [herein-
after cited as the Vienna Convention].
5. 22 U.S.C. §§ 288a-288i (1976).
6. See United States v. Egonov, 222 F. Supp. 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). See also Ling,
A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Mem-
ber Representatives, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 91 (1976).
7. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the Supreme Court held that,
where possession of illegal material is an ingredient of the offense, the defendant has a
sufficient interest in the material to establish "automatic standing."
8. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
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goods or chattels by 22 U.S.C. section 252' should be construed con-
sistently with the full immunity conferred on a foreign diplomat by
that statute and by Article 29 of the Vienna Convention. Therefore,
the defendants urged, all items in Zinyakin's possession should be
protected from seizure.
The focus of the court's consideration of this issue centered on
the construction to be given to the terms "goods or chattels" under
22 U.S.C. section 252. The origins of this statute trace back to the
English Diplomatic Privilege Act of 17080 which provided the basis
for the first American diplomatic immunity statute in 1790." The
provisions of the 1790 Act have been carried forward, with only mi-
nor changes to the present. Despite this statutory heritage, however,
the terms "goods or chattels" have been given only sparse judicial
interpretation, none of it dealing with the issue at hand.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the proper interpretation
must be drawn from the policies underlying the grant of diplomatic
immunity. For this, the court referred to the writings of Grotius and
Vattel. Grotius set forth that an ambassador should enjoy full im-
munity to his person and those things which are necessary for the
fulfillment of his consulary duties." Similarly, Vattel wrote that a
foreign minister's entitlement to immunity should extend to those
things that eriable him to live in dignity and to discharge his func-
tions as a minister." As might be expected, applying these sweeping
principles, the court held that illegally obtained national defense in-
formation of the host state is not helpful or necessary for the fulfill-
ment of the diplomatic function, and thus could not be afforded the
protection of immunity.
This situation is analogous to the case of the thief who, when
compelled to return the goods to the rightful owner, cannot claim
that he has been deprived of his property. Zinyakin knew that the
Tropicana carton contained stolen national defense information, and
thus could not claim that he had been deprived of his "goods or
chattels" under the statute. The court supported this holding by re-
ferring to the underlying equities involved. As stated by Vattel, the
receiving state has the right and justification to take all steps to
prevent a foreign diplomat from conspiring to defeat the sovereign
9. See 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1976).
10. 7 Anne c. 12 (1708).
11. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 117 (1790).
12. 2 H. GaOrius, THE RiOmIs oF WAR AND PEAcu, ch. 18, § 9 (Grotius Society
ed. 1969).
13. E. VArrgL, Tuz LAw OF NATIONS, 491-92 (Chitty ed. 1817).
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of which he is a guest." Moreover, had the FBI agents waited until
Zinyakin delivered the package to Enger, who apparently was in
charge of the operation, seizure of the carton could have been made
incident to Enger's arrest and therefore no right of diplomatic im-
munity would have been violated. Since the carton was in "plain
view," and because the agents had a limited search warrant to retrieve
the carton, the court held that the agents had acted properly.
The court noted that this holding is consistent with the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The court quoted the introduc-
tory language of the Convention which sets forth the objective of
maintaining international peace and security and the promotion of
friendly relations among nations. Article 3 provides that the func-
tions of a diplomatic mission consist of the ascertainment "by all
lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state"
and the promotion of "friendly relations between the sending State
and the receiving State." Since operating as a spy is not within these
diplomatic functions, Zinyakin could not claim protection under the
Convention, and thus the FBI's seizure of the Tropicana carton con-
taining the national defense films was proper.
The court's decision in this case clarifies the scope of protection
provided by diplomatic immunity. Initially the court reiterated the
principle that full diplomatic immunity is afforded only to those for-
eign diplomats that are officially accredited by the receiving state.
Foreign nationals employed by international organizations such as
the United Nations are entitled to immunity only with respect to
activities performed in their official capacity. The court interpreted
the grant of full immunity to accredited diplomats as to not include
protection from seizure of illegally obtained information which could
be used to the detriment of the receiving state. Although this deci-
sion, which is based on the broad principle that foreign diplomats
cannot abuse the comity of the receiving state, does not abrogate a
diplomat's entitlement to immunity, it does prevent the use of that
immunity as a subterfuge for illegal espionage activities.
Gerald D. Pratt
14. Id. at 476-78.
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